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The Finnish Great Depression: From Russia with Love
*
 
During the period 1991-93, Finland experienced the deepest economic downturn in an 
industrialized country since the 1930s. We argue that the culprit behind this Great 
Depression was the collapse of Finnish trade with the Soviet Union, because it induced a 
costly restructuring of the manufacturing sector and a sudden, large increase in the cost of 
energy. We develop and calibrate a multi-sector dynamic general equilibrium model with 
labor market frictions, and show that the collapse of Soviet-Finnish trade can explain key 
features of Finland’s Great Depression. We also show that Finland’s Great Depression 
mirrors the macroeconomic dynamics of the transition economies of Eastern Europe. These 
economies experienced a similar trade collapse. However, as a western democracy with 
developed capital markets and institutions, Finland faced none of the large institutional 
adjustments that other transition economies experienced. Thus, by studying the Finnish 
experience we isolate the adjustment costs due solely to the collapse of Soviet trade. 
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I  Introduction  
Understanding great depressions has long been one of the central challenges in macroeconomics. 
Their massive costs as well as disagreement over their causes and propagation vehicles are 
subject to continuous debate. We examine the Finnish Great Depression of the early 1990s to 
shed new light on important transmission mechanisms that can drive great depressions through 
disruption of international trade relationships. We also show that our analysis of the Finnish 
Great Depression can be very useful for understanding the macroeconomic implications of large 
structural shocks affecting trade arrangements and the terms of trade in other countries 
(particularly in the case of the transition economies of Eastern Europe in the aftermath of the 
collapse of the Soviet Union).   
During the 1991-93 period, Finland experienced the deepest economic slump in an 
industrialized country since the 1930s and the deepest peace-time recorded recession in Finnish 
history. As illustrated in Panel A of Figure 1, between 1990 and 1993 real GDP declined by 11 
percent, real consumption declined by 10 percent and investment fell to 55 percent of its 1990 
level. Over the same period, Finland experienced a quadrupling of unemployment from slightly 
under 4 percent to a peak of 18.5 percent, and the stock market lost 60 percent of its value. 
We argue that the collapse of trade with the Soviet Union played a major role in causing 
the 1990s Great Depression in Finland, since it caused a costly restructuring of the 
manufacturing sector and a sudden, significant increase in the cost of energy. The barter-type 
trade arrangements between the USSR and Finland skewed Finnish manufacturing production 
and investment toward particular industries, and effectively allowed Finland to export non-
competitive products in exchange for energy imports at an overvalued exchange rate. The demise 
of the USSR provides an exceptionally unique natural experiment for which we know with 
precision the timing, nature and size of the exogenous shocks that hit the Finnish economy.  
Furthermore, unlike previous analyses of earlier depressions or downturns in developing 
economies, we have access to high quality economic data at different levels of aggregation and 
frequency.  
We develop and calibrate a multi-sector dynamic general equilibrium model that 
accounts for the key features of the Finnish Great Depression as the economy’s response to the 
two shocks caused by the collapse of trade with the Soviet Union (the sudden loss of the market 
for specialized exports to the USSR and the surge in the relative price of imported energy). The   2
model generates large declines in aggregate output, consumption and employment, and replicates 
the dynamics of the sector devoted to Soviet trade, the non-Soviet sector of tradable goods, and 
the nontradables sector. The deep, persistent recession follows from the rise in energy costs and 
the reallocation of resources induced by the sudden obsolescence of the sizable sector that 
produced specialized goods destined for export to the Soviet Union. Our simulations also suggest 
that downward wage rigidity observed in Finland played a key role in the amplification of the 
downturn produced by these shocks.  
We validate the model by examining its ability to match the behavior of the Finnish 
economy in a previous episode of a sudden rise in energy costs, the oil price hike of the 1970s. 
The model does well at reproducing the dynamics of macroeconomic variables in this episode. In 
addition, we compare the experience of Finland in the aftermath of the collapse of the Soviet 
Union with that of Sweden. Sweden is widely regarded as sharing many of the same structural 
features that characterize Finland, and it went through a similar initial economic downturn in the 
early 1990s (including currency and banking crises). Sweden did not, however, trade extensively 
with the Soviet Union. Hence this comparison provides us with a natural experiment in which 
one country (Finland) was hit by the Soviet shock and the other (Sweden) was not. Our findings 
from this comparison support the model’s quantitative predictions, because the downturn in 
Sweden was much milder and of shorter duration than in Finland.     
The impact of the trade shocks on Finland is interesting in its own right, but it is 
especially compelling in light of the similar experiences of the Eastern European transition 
economies (TEs). Panel B in Figure 1 plots real GDP in the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, 
Slovenia, Slovakia, Bulgaria and Finland. The figure captures the familiar “U-shaped” path for 
output characteristic of TEs (Blanchard and Kremer 1997, Roland and Verdier 1999). With the 
exception of Poland, output declined between 1990 and 1993 in all TEs, and the magnitude of 
the cumulated output drop ranged from roughly 7 to 21 percent of the level of GDP in 1990. The 
most remarkable feature of the figure is that the adjustment path for Finnish GDP in the post-
1990 period is virtually identical to those observed in the TEs.
1 Finland experienced the full 
                                                           
1 A number of papers have explored the possible impact of trade on output in transition economies. Shortly after the 
dismantling of the Soviet Union, Rodrik (1994) estimated that the collapse of trade with the USSR could account for 
a 7 to 8 percent decline in GDP in Hungary and Czechoslovakia and a 3.5 percent decline in Poland. At the time 
these papers were written, it was too early to characterize the transition path and U-shaped pattern of output 
resulting from the loss of trade, but Rodrik's work suggested that trade was a key factor in understanding the 
dramatic decline in output in 1990 and 1991. In Appendix Table E1, we use Rodrik’s method to compute the static   3
force of the Soviet trade shock, but as a western democracy with developed capital markets and 
institutions, faced none of the institutional adjustments experienced in the TEs. Thus, by 
studying the Finnish experience we isolate the adjustment costs due solely to the collapse of 
trade from the other burdens of adjustment borne by TEs. To the best of our knowledge, these 
results provide the first quantitative assessment of the significance of the trade shocks for 
explaining the downturn in these economies. To the extent that these shocks, combined with 
standard macroeconomic reallocation costs and frictions, can account for the depressions in TEs, 
the role of other factors such as institutional transformations may be smaller than previously 
thought.    
The crisis in Finland has been examined in other studies that offer explanations 
alternative to ours. One view is that the origins of the Finnish depression were largely financial, 
working through the banking sector and ultimately triggering a twin currency-banking crisis 
(Honkapohja and Koskela 1999, Honkapohja et al 1996). Another view argues that labor tax 
hikes and negative productivity shocks may have been the culprit (Conesa, Kehoe and Ruhl, 
2007). While these factors are obviously worth considering as additional important elements of 
the Finnish crisis, this paper shows that the mechanism we propose is relevant on its own and can 
also rationalize some of the empirical observations that motivate these alternative views.  
In the next section of the paper we describe the key features of Finland's trading 
relationship with the USSR that are central to our argument. In Section III, we develop the 
dynamic model of the Finnish economy. In Section IV the model is calibrated using Finnish data 
before the collapse of Soviet trade. Then we hit the model economy with the shocks caused by 
the collapse of the Soviet Union, as once-and-for-all unanticipated shocks in a deterministic 
environment, and compare the model’s dynamics with the dynamics observed in the data. In 
section V, we compare our trade theory of the Finnish recession with alternative explanations 
proposed in the literature. In section VI, we compare the Finnish experience with the experience 
of TEs, and discuss how our conclusion for Finland can be extended to other countries. We make 
concluding remarks in Section VII.  
 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
cost of the Soviet trade collapse for Finland. The size of the shock is comparable to the Soviet trade shocks 
experienced by Eastern European transition countries.   4
II  Finnish-Soviet Trade 
Finland and the USSR had a series of five-year, highly regulated trade agreements, similar to the 
agreements between the USSR and its East European allies. These agreements established the 
volume and composition of trade between the two countries, and by the late 1980s they had 
evolved into a barter of Finnish manufactures for Soviet crude oil. In principle, trade was to be 
balanced annually, though arrangements were periodically made to allow for temporary 
imbalances.
2 These trade imbalances were the subject of annual interim negotiations and were 
usually cleared on the Finnish side through supplemental exports above the agreed quotas or on 
the Soviet side by additional petroleum exports.  
By 1975, the USSR was Finland’s most important trading partner. Panel C in Figure 1 
plots the share of Soviet exports in total exports over the 1970-2003 period. During the early to 
mid-1980s, the USSR accounted for 20-25 percent of Finnish trade flows. Thereafter, the volume 
of trade with the Soviet Union began to gradually decline until the collapse of the trade 
agreement. Part of the decline during the 1980s was an endogenous contraction, resulting from 
falling oil prices. The decline was also a consequence of the reforms under Perestroika, which 
attempted to decentralize Soviet decision making but made it difficult for Finnish authorities to 
identify those with real authority on the Soviet end of the bargain. The trade regime fully 
collapsed and all contracts with the Soviet Union were cancelled on December 18, 1990.  
Roughly 80 percent of Finnish imports from the USSR in the early 1980s were in the 
form of mineral fuels and crude materials (Panel D, Figure 1). More than 90 percent of imported 
oil and 100 percent of imported natural gas came from the USSR. Under the terms of the 
bilateral agreement, the value of crude oil exports to Finland was determined by the dollar price 
of crude oil on the world market and then converted to rubles using the official ruble/dollar 
exchange rate. From the Finnish perspective, the volume of bilateral trade was thus a function of 
Finnish oil import demand given the world price of oil. During the oil crises of the 1970s, the oil-
for-manufactures structure of trade provided Finland with a buffer against the cyclical 
fluctuations experienced in most other industrialized countries. As oil prices rose, Finland was 
able to expand employment and production in those sectors exporting to the USSR to finance the 
higher cost of energy imports.  
                                                           
2 See Mottola, Bykov and Korolev (1983) and Oblath and Pete (1990) for a more complete discussion of the history 
of trade relations between the USSR and Finland and the bilateral clearing system.   5
On the export side, the five-year trade agreements established explicit quotas for the 
export of manufactures to the USSR. While the total volume of exports was established by the 
bilateral trade agreement, the specific quantities and unit prices of the items to be exported was 
established through direct negotiations. Typically, trade associations conducted the negotiations, 
applied for export licenses from the Finnish government, and distributed the rights to export 
among their members. A key condition of the export license was an 80 percent domestic content 
restriction. The majority of exports to the USSR took the form of manufactured goods and 
machinery and transport equipment, which included the production of ships.  
It was widely perceived that exporting to the USSR was a lucrative business for Finnish 
firms. Pre-commitment to the five-year contracts eliminated exchange rate and business cycle 
risk for firms. Surveys of managers and industry experts indicated that Soviet trade was a low 
risk, low cost, and long-term business. In a survey of the structural effects of Soviet trade on the 
Finnish economy, Kajaste (1992, p. 29) concludes that “[Soviet] exports seem to have been 
exceptionally profitable.”  More formally, Kajaste (1992) uses unit prices of Soviet and non-
Soviet exports and estimates that the prices of exports to the Soviet Union were at least 9.5 
percent higher than those for exports to western markets. We find an even larger 36 percent 
markup when we replicate Kajaste’s analysis using more recent trade data at 5-digit-level of 
disaggregation for 1990. This markup suggests that if a Finnish industry redirected its Soviet 
trade to other countries, its goods would be competitive only if sold at a 10 to 36 percent 
discount.
3 Hence, the Finnish economy was subsidized by overvalued prices of Finnish 
manufactures bartered for Soviet oil so that the effective price of Soviet oil was at least 10 
percent cheaper than its market price.  
                                                           
3 There are several reasons why the USSR was willing to overpay for Finnish goods. First, neutral Finland was the 
key source of modern Western know-how for the Soviet Union. For example, Finland supplied products with 
sensitive technologies such as deep-sea submersible, nuclear icebreakers, telecommunications equipment (Nokia), 
etc. Other countries had much tighter export controls against the Soviet bloc, with particular focus on blocking the 
transfer of technology. Second, the Soviet Union used the Finnish-Soviet trade as a lab for testing various forms of 
capitalist and socialist cooperation. Political leaders in Finland and the USSR viewed trade as a guarantee of 
peaceful co-existence. For example, Urho Kekkonen, the Finnish prime minister and president for three decades, 
wrote in 1974, “…our whole stable foreign policy course demands that we do keep the Soviet markets.” Third, the 
Soviet subsidy was aimed at maintaining political status quo in Finland where left parties played an important role. 
A former leader of Soviet intelligence in Finland once wrote, “One can go to any lengths in thinking, whether 
Kekkonen was a Soviet ‘agent of influence’, but hardly anybody denies that the Finns had a president who pumped 
enormous amounts of economic benefit from Soviet leaders against short-term political concessions … and thus 
Finnish standards of living increased” (cited in Sutela 2007).   6
Finnish exports to the USSR were typically specialized for the Soviet market and did not 
compete directly with products traded in western markets. To assess the degree of specialization 
of the goods destined for the USSR, Kajaste (1992) computes the share of Soviet exports at 4-
digit level of CCCN classification and finds strong concentration of trade. Conditional on 
exporting a good to the East, more than 80 percent of all exports of this good went to socialist 
countries. At the more detailed 7-digit level, Kajaste (1992) identifies 133 items with a Soviet 
export share exceeding 90 percent. These items constituted approximately 40 percent of exports 
to the USSR. Kajaste (1992) reports that because of the highly specialized nature of goods traded 
with the Council of Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA), the collapse of trade with the Eastern 
markets was compensated only to a very limited extent by redirecting trade to the West. The 
extent of specialization was such that firms’ capacity developed for trading with the USSR 
became more or less obsolete overnight.
4,5 
Table 1 shows exports to the USSR by sector, as a share of sectoral exports and as a share 
of sectoral value added. The table focuses on the year 1988, before the uncertainties of 
Perestroika began to disrupt trade contracts. Among the sectors with heaviest Soviet-trade 
exposure were textiles, textile products, leather and footwear, with Soviet exports accounting for 
29 percent of exports and 34 percent of value added. Machinery and equipment also had 
significant Soviet exposure at both the aggregate and disaggregated level. The sector with the 
heaviest exposure was transport equipment, and this exposure is further concentrated in 
shipbuilding (85 percent of exports designated for the USSR and 225 percent of value added) 
and railroad equipment (86 percent of exports to USSR and 103 percent of value added). A 
message of Table 1 is that while some manufacturing sectors were particularly specialized in 
goods destined for the Soviet market, no sector was fully isolated from the loss of Soviet trade. 
                                                           
4 The fact that Finnish exports to the USSR could have had a limited success in the West was clearly understood at 
the time. Urho Kekkonen, President of the Republic and a very active promoter of trade and economic cooperation 
with the Soviet Union, wrote in a private letter on 20 November 1972: “We must of necessity maintain a relatively 
large trade with the West, but of much importance is the fact that we are able to sell to the Soviet market in the main 
such goods that would be very difficult to market into the West.” Cited in Sutela (2005). 
5 Another important aspect of trade with the USSR was industry concentration. Only 600 or so firms exported to the 
USSR in the 1970s, while more than 3,000 firms exported to Sweden (Sutela 1991). In 1989 the total number of 
Finnish exporters to the USSR was 1,688. The five largest exporters accounted for 39.9 percent of all exports, the 
fifty largest for 78.7 percent, 116 largest for 90 percent (Sutela 2005). This concentration of the Finnish-Soviet trade 
resembles trade within CMEA. Given this concentration, economies of scale were often cited as an important source 
of profitability in the Finnish-Soviet trade. The scale of production also often implies that firms were likely to be 
multi-product.   7
The collapse of Soviet trade was largely unanticipated. It was clear that the Soviet Union 
was under distress in the late 1980s, and that some Finnish companies faced difficulty in their 
trade dealings with the Soviets. However, news articles and policy analyses from the period 
suggest that Finnish government officials and firms remained optimistic about the future of trade 
with the USSR.
6 
The collapse was quick and deep. Imports of oil from the USSR fell from 8.2 million tons 
in 1989 to 1.3 million tons in 1992. Exports tumbled down by 84 percent over the same period. 
Figure 2 shows the exports of four industries that sent a significant share of their exports to the 
USSR (Cable and wire with the 1990 Soviet share of total exports of 30 percent; Railroad 
equipments with 96 percent; Shipbuilding with 74 percent; and Footwear with 43 percent). In 
general, the loss of Soviet exports caused total exports to fall, suggesting that the goods were not 
redirected to other counties. After the collapse of trade with the USSR in December of 1990, 
entire industries had to be reorganized throughout the early 1990s. Even for industries that had 
some export recovery (e.g., shipbuilding), the loss of the Soviet market was painful as it involved 
major transformations in product lines. The strategy of “icebreakers for the communists, luxury 
liners for the capitalists” meant that production facilities specialized for Soviet production had to 
be shut down.
7  
To fully understand the reaction of the Finnish economy to the collapse of the Soviet 
trade, it is important to examine the Finnish labor market because of its very high degree of 
unionization. In 1993, approximately 85 percent of workers belonged to unions and almost 95 
percent of workers were covered by collective agreements (Böckerman and Uusitalo, 2006). 
                                                           
6 For example, in July 1990 the Wall Street Journal reported that Finnish Premier Harri Holkeri was surprised by the 
announcement that the Soviet Union would end the bilateral agreement in December, earlier than was originally 
planned. A representative of the central bank suggested that it was still possible that the system would be reformed, 
and not fully dismantled. The private sector was equally surprised by the collapse of the Soviet trade. For example, 
Nokia remained confident that sales to the Soviet Union would continue at their mid-1980 levels. In 1991 Nokia’s 
sales to the USSR came in at just 2 million markka instead of 121 million markka as projected. More broadly, 
Jonung (2008) argues that professional forecasters failed to predict the timing and later the depth of the coming 
recessionas well as the collapse of the USSR 
7 Sutela (1991) provides a case study of the shipbuilding industry in Finland. Finnish shipbuilders had supplied the 
Soviet Union since 1940s. The major companies were Valmet (state-owned), Repola, Wartsila, and Hollming. 
Hollming was the only one of these firms specialized in shipbuilding. The other companies were large corporations 
with a broad nomenclature of products. Historically shipyards fared well in terms of profits and accumulated a 
unique know-how in the industry. For example, most icebreakers operating in the world were produced in Finland. 
With the collapse of the Soviet Union, the shipyards were in deep trouble. Policymakers and business circles were 
openly discussing whether the Soviets would allow these companies to go bankrupt. Valmet’s shipbuilding 
operations were sold to Wartsila, which knowingly took orders for loss-making luxury cruises (another field of 
specialization) for the Caribbean, underestimated domestic cost increases and declared its shipbuilding branch 
insolvent. The new company established upon the ruins of Wartsila-Marine was later sold to a Norwegian company.   8
Since most employers are organized in federations, the wage bargaining normally starts at the 
national level. If a federation or union rejects the nation-wide agreement, it can negotiate its own 
terms. Collective agreements stipulate the wages for different levels of job complexity, 
education, etc. in a given industry. Typically, agreements allow upward wage drift if firms 
perform well. Although the government does not have a formal role in the bargaining process, 
the government usually intermediates negotiations.
8 Not surprisingly, Finland is often classified 
as a country with highly centralized wage setting (e.g., Botero et al 2004). 
Unions did not agree to cut nominal wages in 1992-1993, which were the peak years of 
the depression.
9 Instead, wages were frozen at the 1991 level. Figure 3 reports the distribution of 
wage changes over 1990-1994 for individual workers. There is a clear spike at zero percent 
change for most types of workers in 1992 and 1993.
10 Strikingly, the fraction of workers with no 
wage change reached 75 percent. Thus, the national agreement was binding for a broad array of 
firms and workers. Given that inflation was quite moderate in the 1990s, real wages fell only to a 
limited extent. These findings are consistent with Dickens et al (2007) who cite Finland as the 
country with one of the greatest downward wage rigidities. 
As we will report later, the dynamics of wages at the macro level are similar to the 
dynamics of wages at the micro level. Specifically, wages at the aggregate level had a very weak 
downward adjustment during the Finnish Great Depression. Our micro level evidence strongly 
suggests that very sluggish adjustment of wages at the aggregate level reflects genuine wage 
rigidity rather than compositional changes in employment. We conclude that wage stickiness was 
a prominent feature of the Finnish labor market during the depression.  
 
III A Model of Trade-Induced Great Depressions 
In this section we develop a model of the Finnish economy that captures the key features of the 
trading relationship between the Soviet Union and Finland as well as the Finnish labor market. 
These features include the volume of trade, the composition of trade (barter of manufactures for 
                                                           
8 See Snellman (2005) for a more detailed description of the wage bargaining process in Finland.  
9 Table E2 provides a summary of wage agreements in the 1990s. 
10 There is more variability in wage changes for manual workers. We should note that the distribution of wage 
changes for manual workers in 1992-1993 is similar to the distribution of wages changes in other year. In part, this 
distribution reflects the fact that earnings of manual workers are more variable due to changes in hours worked. 
Changes in wage rates are much more downward rigid (see Snellman, 2004).    9
oil), overvalued terms of trade, low elasticity of substitution between goods destined for the 
Soviet market and western markets, and rigid labor markets. 
We model the Finnish economy as a small open economy with three sectors. Sector 1 
(non-Soviet sector) produces a traded good consumed at home and sold abroad in western 
markets. Sector 2 (Soviet sector) produces a good that can be consumed at home or sold 
exclusively to the Soviet Union. Sector 3 (services) produces non-tradable goods. We use 
baseline functional forms and parameters that seem the most consistent with the Finnish data or 
that help us simplify the analysis.
11  
Households 
The representative household chooses a lifetime plan for consumption and labor allocations to 
maximize utility  123 0 (,, , )
t
tttt t UU G L L L 

  , where G is a CES consumption aggregator over 
four consumption goods and Lit for i=1,2,3 is the labor supplied to each sector. The consumption 
aggregator is given by 
1/
11 22 33 44 {}
CCCC C
tt ttt GC C C C
        where 1/(1 ) C    is the elasticity 
of substitution in consumption,  j   are weights in the consumption aggregator, C1t is the 
consumption of the good produced by sector 1, C2t is the consumption of the good produced by 
the sector with Soviet exposure, C3t is the consumption of services, and C4t is the consumption of 
a good imported from the western markets.
12  
We follow Greenwood, Hercowitz and Huffman (1988) and assume a period utility 
function   
3 12 3 12
12 3
(1 ) 1 11 1
123 1 2 3 11 1 1 (,, , ) tttt t t t t UGL L L G L L L
    
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  
       where 1/  is the 
elasticity of intertemporal substitution, 1/ j   is the Frisch elasticity of labor supply in sector j and 
j   is the scale of disutility from working in sector j. Note that labor is sector specific and hence 
wages are not generally equalized across sectors.
13 Total employment is defined as 
123 tttt L LLL . 
                                                           
11 We provide in Appendix D a detailed sensitivity analysis that shows that our results are robust to relaxing several 
assumptions of the baseline setup. In particular, we introduce habit persistence in consumption, vary elasticities of 
substitution of sectoral labor supplies, allow for adjustment costs in investment and labor, allow for less-than-unitary 
elasticity of substitution between capital and labor and introduce decreasing returns to scale.   
12 The fourth consumption good allows the model to capture the fact that the Soviet trade accounted only for a 
fraction of total trade. 
13 We had a modeling choice between having sector specific labor supply and having decreasing returns to scale in 
production. These two options ensure that the production possibility frontier is concave and hence the model 
economy does not fully specialize (see Baxter (1992) for more details on linearity/concavity of the production   10
We assume that households are exclusive owners of domestic firms. Households face the 
following budget constraint: 
11 22 33 1 1 1 , 1 2 2 2 , 1 3 3 3 , 1 ()( )() tt t t tt t t t t t t t t t t t wL wL wL q d K q d K q d K R B            
1 1 1 ,2 2 , 3 3 ,12 23 34 4 t t t t t t t t tt tt tt B qK qK qK C pC pC pC    ,   (1) 
where wj is the wage rate in sector j = 1,2,3, Bt is a one-period bond traded on international 
markets at the gross world interest rate of Rt, qj is the price of capital in sector j, dj is the dividend 
on capital in sector j. 
Production 
Firms in all three sectors use inputs of capital (K), labor and energy (E) to produce. The problem 
faced by the representative firm in each industry is to choose inputs to maximize profits. In 
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where  is the rate of depreciation of the capital stock,  is a capital adjustment cost coefficient, 
and pjt is the relative price of goods in sector j (we take good 1 as numeraire so p1t = 1) and 
E
t p  is 
the relative price of energy.  
Production functions are given by 
/
,1 min{ ,( ) }
jP PP
jt jE jt jK j t jL jt Qa E KL
     , for j=1,2,3, 
where ajE is the energy requirement in sector j, 1/(1 ) P    is the elasticity of substitution between 
capital and labor,  jK   and  jL   are weights in the capital-labor aggregator, and  j   measures 
returns to scale in sector j. We assume that energy and value added are perfect complements 
because the ability of firms to substitute away from energy is very small in the short run. At an 
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possibility frontier for economies where inputs can be accumulated). It was common in Finland that different units 
of firms produced goods for different markets (i.e., Soviet, non-Soviet, non-tradable). In our analysis we study the 
effects of the Finnish-Soviet trade collapse using synthetic sectors (i.e., Soviet, non-Soviet, non-tradable) 
constructed from disaggregate industry level data. Hence, we prefer sector specific labor supply because constant 
returns to scale in production allows straightforward aggregation of firms producing different goods (i.e., Soviet, 
non-Soviet, non-tradable) into sectors.    11
,1 (, , , )
E
j j t jt jt t jt FK L p p Y   . Note that for simplicity the three sectors do not have direct linkages 
via input-output relationships.  
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where  ,1 ,1 / jt jt j t MPK Y K     is the marginal product of capital.
14  
Market clearing and equilibrium 
In Sector 1, output is consumed, invested in that same sector (since investment net of 
depreciation, I, is also sector specific) or exported: 
11 1 1 0, tt t t QCI X     (3) 
where X1 measures net exports of the non-Soviet good. These are exports of goods to western 
markets in exchange for energy imports, M
*, purchased at a world relative price p
*, and for 
imports of good C4 purchased at world relative price p4t. Hence, the non-Soviet balance of trade 
can be defined as follows: 
**
14 4 1 . tt t tt t tt t TB X p M p C B R B      (4) 
In the Soviet sector, output is consumed by domestic consumers, invested in sector 2, or 
sold to the Soviet market in exchange for energy: 
22 2 2 0, tt t t QCI X     (5) 
where X2t measures export to the USSR. To capture the clearing system in the Finnish-Soviet 
trade, we assume that trade with the Soviet Union is balanced at all times. Hence, the Soviet 
trade balance is: 
22 0,
SS
tt tt pX pM   (6) 
where 
S
t p  is the barter price of energy contracted with the Soviet union for a quantity 
S
t M  of 
energy imports. The values of 
S
t p  and 
S
t M are fixed, since they were set by the five-year 
agreements between Finland and the USSR. 
                                                           
14 In some specifications of the numerical simulations we allow for returns to scale to be less than one. Profits in 
those cases are rebated to the household.   12
We assume that Finland produces no energy domestically and energy is not storable so 
that imports of energy are equal to domestic consumption of energy:  
*
123 () 0 .
S
tt tt t MM EEE    (7) 
In sector 3, since goods are nontradable, domestic production equals domestic absorption: 
33 3 0, tt t QCI   (8) 
We enable the model to capture the slow adjustment of wages by assuming that real 
wages in each sector j=1,2,3 evolve as follows:  
,1 (1 ) ,
D
jt j j t j jt ww w     (9) 
where the parameter   governs the degree of wage stickiness and w
D is the reservation wage 
given by the household labor supply. One interpretation of these wage dynamics is that trade 
unions take the wage in the previous period as a starting point in bargaining (“status quo” wages) 
and gradually change the wage to increase the employment of union workers. Specifically,  1    
corresponds to complete real wage rigidity, while  0    corresponds to complete real wage 
flexibility. Regardless of  , 
D
jj ww   in the pre-Soviet-collapse steady state. Given the wage, 
market-clearing in the labor market is demand determined (i.e. by finding the labor allocation 
that satisfies the labor demand condition and the settled wage). 
  An equilibrium of this economy is defined as intertemporal sequences of allocations 
{L1t,L2t,L3t,C1t,C2t,C3t,C4t,I1t,I2t,I3t,Y1t,Y2t,Y3t,E1t,E2t,E3t,q1t,q2t,q3t,Q1t,Q2t,Q3t,  
 ,X1t,X2t,Bt    
   and 
prices {p2t,p3t,w1t,w2t,w3t,q1t,q2t,q3t    
  } that solve the household’s problem and the problem of 
each representative firm, and that satisfy the market clearing conditions (3)-(9), for given initial 
conditions {K10,K20,K30,w10,w20,w30} and intertemporal sequences of exogenous variables 
40 {, , ,}
ES
ttt t t pMpR

 . In our quantitative analysis we focus on equilibria that start from initial 
conditions calibrated to match the Finnish economy at a stationary equilibrium just before the 
collapse of the Soviet Union, and with the sequence of exogenous variables set to reflect the 
sudden increase in the cost of energy and the collapse of the market for exports to the USSR. The 
precise specification of these initial conditions and shocks is described in the next Section.    
   13
IV Quantitative Analysis 
Data 
One of the challenges in mapping the model to the data is that the pervasiveness of Soviet 
exports throughout the manufacturing sector makes it difficult to separate out a “Soviet” sector 
from a “non-Soviet” sector. In the model, the trade shock will be concentrated in sectors with 
heaviest exposure to Soviet trade. In the data, the “Soviet-exposed” sector will be defined as a 
weighted index of industrial sectors. We define 
X
it   as the share of exports of industry i at time t 
to the Soviet Union in total exports of industry i. Let Qit be value added (or any other the variable 
of interest) in industry i at time t. Then we compute value added in the Soviet-exposed sector as 
SX
ti t i t i QQ    and correspondingly the non-Soviet-exposed sector is  (1 )
NS X
ti t i t i QQ    . We 
treat services as a separate sector producing non-tradable goods. We allow the weights, 
X
it   , to 
change over the 1989-1992 period. The relative size of the Soviet sector will therefore decline 
automatically as trade with the USSR collapses.  
We provide details on data sources and construction of sectors as well as detrending in 
the data Appendix B. We take 1989 as the “pre-collapse” benchmark year. Based on this 
definition, Table 2 shows the share of the Soviet sector in total value added, capital/labor ratios, 
employment and output shares as well as other descriptive statistics in the base year.  
Calibration 
The model is calibrated at a quarterly frequency. The quarterly deprecation rate of capital is the 
same across sectors and equal to   0.025 (i.e., approximately 10 percent at the annual 
frequency). The discount factor is  0.99    so that the real rate or return is 4 percent per annum, 
assuming the standard stationarity condition that equates the rate of interest with the rate of time 
preference. We also calibrate the intertemporal elasticity of substitution as 1/ 1/2   , the 
standard value in the RBC literature.  
Micro level studies favor very large values for , so that the labor supply elasticity 1/  
is small. On the other hand, macro level models need relatively large labor supply elasticity to 
generate large movements in labor. Recently, Hall (2007) provided empirical evidence indicating 
that the elasticity is about 0.91 in the United States. In line with this evidence, we set  1   .    14
We assume unit elasticity of substitution in consumption, i.e.,  0 C   . Given this 
assumption, consumption shares can be computed from the input-output matrices which provide 
us with the information on consumption expenditures by sector. We find that 
1234 0.15; 0.04; 0.54; 0.27   .  
Our baseline calibration assumes that the production function is Cobb-Douglas (i.e., 
0 P   ). In this case, we can read the  jL   from the labor shares in sector j. In 1989, shares of 
labor compensation in value added were  1 0.57 L   ,  2 0.63 L    and  3 0.63 L   .
15  
We define units of oil in such a way that the unit price of oil before the collapse of the 
Soviet Union is equal to one (i.e., the price of the numeraire). Because energy and value added 
are Leontieff complements, the energy requirement in the non-Soviet sector is given by 
11 11 1 1 //
E aQ Ep Q p E  . Since we know the cost structure (specifically expenditures on 
energy), we can compute energy requirement for the non-Soviet sector as the ratio of cost (value 
added plus energy expenditures) to energy expenditures. For the non-Soviet sector this ratio is 
equal to 21.56. For other sectors, we cannot make this calculation directly because it depends on 
prices determined at equilibrium. We can impute the relative prices using cost shares for labor, 
capital labor ratios and relative wages and then compute energy intensity for the Soviet and 
service sectors:  2 37.84 a  and 3 47.51 a  . These parameter values imply that the share of Soviet 
exports in total exports is approximately 18 percent, which is consistent with the share observed 
in the data.  
Using information on employment shares and relative wages, we can calculate ratios 
214.127    and  310.324    . Because utility is Cobb-Douglas and we need only total 
expenditures on the imported good C4, we set  4 1 p  , without loss of generality.  Since  1   
regulates only the scale of the economy, we set without loss of generality  1 0.4   . Since more 
than 90 percent of energy was imported from the USSR we assume that in the pre-Soviet-
collapse period no energy was imported from other countries. We assume small to moderate 
                                                           
15 Empirical studies, however, tend to find that the elasticity of substitution between capital and labor is smaller than 
one. Thus, in our sensitivity experiments we examined the case with  ρP = –1, which implies 0.5 elasticity of 
substitution between capital and labor. Also, the Cobb-Douglas formulation imposes constant returns to scale, but 
evidence for the United States documented by Rotemberg and Woodford (1995) and Basu and Fernald (1997) 
suggests that returns to scale may be about 0.97. Given that Finland has more concentrated industries, the share of 
economic profits may be higher than this estimate, so in our sensitivity analysis we set returns to scale to 0.95.   15
adjustment costs in capital stock:  123 1     .
16 We provide more details about the calibration 
in Appendix C.  
As we have discussed above, wages in Finland are downwardly rigid and wage 
adjustment in the early 1990s was very slow. Indeed, we do not observe large movements in real 
or nominal wages in Finland over the 1990s (see Figure 3). In light of these facts, we set 
123 0.99    , which corresponds to the maximum annual decline of real wages equal to 
4% and approximately matches the 1-2% decline of real wages during the depression.  By setting 
this high value of wage rigidity we want to capture downward wage rigidity in this particular 
historical episode since we anticipate that wages in our model will have to fall in response to the 
trade shocks caused by the Soviet collapse. Table 3 summarizes calibrated parameters. 
Simulating the Effects of the Soviet Trade Collapse: Benchmark results 
We study the response of the Finnish economy to the collapse of trade with the Soviet Union, 
modeled as a once-and-for-all unanticipated event at t = 0 in a deterministic environment. As we 
explained, this event produced two shocks for Finland. First, Finland lost one of its major export 
markets, and because of the specialized trade with the USSR Finnish firms could not easily 
redirect trade to other countries. We model this shock as a permanent drop in Soviet oil imports 
S
t M   to zero for all t. This also implied that export to the USSR  2t X vanished. Hence, the second 
shock was the end of the Soviet Union’s provision of subsidized energy for Finland. Our 
discussion in Section II suggests that this subsidy was at least 10 percent of the world oil price. 
Thus we assume that the second shock was equivalent to an increase in the oil price from  1
E p   
to  1.1
E p   also for all t. We hit our model economy with these shocks as of the initial date t=0 
and compute the transitional dynamics leading to the new post-Soviet-collapse stationary 
equilibrium. We assume that the bond position Bt is zero at t=0.
17 
Figure 4 plots actual and simulated responses for key macroeconomic variables measured 
as percent deviations from the pre-collapse steady state.
18 The model can capture the dynamics 
                                                           
16 Groth (2006) presents the range of estimates reported in the literature.  
17 Following Mendoza and Tesar (1998), we use shooting and log-linear approximation around the post-Soviet-
collapse steady state to adjust transitional dynamics for steady state changes in the net foreign asset position. We 
choose  Bt=0 because the average net export to GDP ratio for Finland between 1980 and 1990   
was very close to zero. 
18 Note that since we fit trends to each series in the data individually, we can have a discrepancy in the dynamics of 
output and inputs. Value added and consumption are computed in constant pre-collapse prices.    16
of output well in terms of magnitude. The model predicts an output decline of 20 percent nearly 
identical to that observed in the data, albeit the trough is reached in 1991 in the model versus 
1992 in the data. Very similar results are also obtained for consumption and employment. Both 
decline about as much as in the data (about 24 percent), but both reach their troughs a year 
earlier than in the data. The model also approximates well the observed dynamics of wages. In 
contrast with the data, the model predicts a recovery in consumption while in the data it does not 
seem to recover. Note, however, that the model is in line with the data in predicting a protracted 
decline in consumption, although of about half the size (10 percent in the model v. 20-22 percent 
in the data). The model also predicts a moderate recovery in employment that is somewhat 
stronger than what is observed in the data. Consistent with the data, the model predicts an 
increase in the net export-GDP ratio, but the increase is gradual in the data while in the model it 
peaks in 1991. 
The model predicts a 26 percent decline in investment over 1991-1993 and a recovery to 
about 12 percent below the long-run trend. This recovery reflects the fact that given our 
functional assumptions and calibrated parameter values, the capital stock to output ratio (and 
hence investment to output ratio) is fairly insensitive to changes in the price of energy, the 
relative prices and wages and consequently the new steady state level of aggregate investment is 
not much affected by the Soviet shock.
19 In contrast, investment in the data falls by 65 percent 
below the trend and although it slightly recovers by 1997 it stays 40 percent below the trend. One 
may expect, however, that if utilization of capital requires energy as in Finn (2000), the relative 
price of capital is going to be higher in the post-Soviet-collapse period and hence the decline in 
investment could be larger and more persistent.  
Figure 5 shows the model and data responses for value added, investment, employment 
and wages at the sectoral level. Generally, the model captures well the qualitative features of the 
dynamics in the Soviet and service sectors, but quantitatively there are non-trivial differences. 
The model predicts permanent declines in value added, employment, investment and wages in 
the Soviet sector, but the model underestimates the drop in value added in the early years of the 
transition, and overestimates the declines in employment, investment and wages. In the services 
                                                           
19 Specifically, in the steady state        ⁄          1 
  
    
    1     1         , which follows from the first order 
condition for capital in sector j.  Note that since aj is relatively large, one needs large variation in p
E and pj to change 
capital to output ratio significantly.    17
sector, the model does well at matching the initial declines of all four macro aggregates, but it 
cannot match the highly persistent declines observed in the data. The model also understates the 
magnitudes of the declines in value added, employment, investment and wages in the non-Soviet 
sector.  
In summary, the model performs reasonably well at matching aggregate dynamics, but is 
less successful at explaining some sectoral dynamics. It is particularly important to note the 
model’s key prediction that the collapse of Soviet trade, which accounted for only about 5 
percent of total employment and value added in Finland, can produce a significant contraction of 
output at the aggregate level (almost 20 percent in 1991).  
The key to understand this strong amplification mechanism is in the combined effect of 
wage rigidity and the role of nontradables. Consider first a two-sector model, with only the 
Soviet and non-Soviet sectors. In this economy, the collapse of trade with the Soviets would put 
pressure on factors to shift from the Soviet to non-Soviet sector. This happens for two reasons: 
first, because the relative price of the Soviet-goods falls, and second, all of Finland’s energy 
needs now have to be financed by exports of the non-Soviet good. If factors are perfectly 
immobile, the maximum output effect is a fall of about 5 percent. To the extent that factors can 
adjust, the decline in output will be smaller.  
What happens when there are nontraded goods in the economy? The trade collapse that 
causes the relative price of oil to rise, increases production costs in both the non-Soviet and 
nontraded goods sectors. In addition, the collapse of demand in the Soviet sector reduces income 
and hence the demand for all other goods. These two effects together lead to a decline in the 
relative price of nontraded goods and output. Rigid wages amplify the contraction in demand in 
the short run. As consumers purchase fewer goods, firms demand less labor which entails further 
contraction of demand and the spiral continues. In summary, a combination of higher costs of 
producing goods, as well as a fall in demand magnified by rigid wages leads to large short-run 
multiplicative effects on the initial shocks. Consistent with this argument, the relative prices of 
Soviet and non-tradable goods fell by 17.4 and 13.3 percent respectively below the trend 
between 1990 and 1995. The model predicts 18 and 5 percent decline after four years for prices 
of Soviet and non-tradable goods respectively. We return to quantitative assessments of the roles 
of nontradables and wage rigidity in the sensitivity analysis.    18
To assess the separate contribution of oil price and trade shocks, we perturb the economy 
with one shock at a time and plot the resulting transitional dynamics of aggregate variables (see 
Figure 4). The economy’s response to an oil price shock is much smaller than to the trade shock. 
In addition, the response to the oil price shock tends to produce an expansion of the Soviet 
sector, because larger exports to the USSR increase the amount of oil that can be imported and 
thus help offset the effect of the higher price of energy (Figure 5). This is consistent with the 
Finnish experience in late 1970s and early 1980s when oil prices increased. By contrast, the trade 
shock leads to an expansion in the non-Soviet sector. In general, the oil and pure trade shocks 
push the Soviet and non-Soviet sectors in different directions, but the two shocks are 
contractionary for the services sector. 
 
Sensitivity Analysis  
In this subsection we vary parameter values to study the sensitivity of our results to alternative 
calibrations. First, we modify the model to introduce habit formation in preferences and add 
quadratic labor and investment adjustment costs (in addition to quadratic capital adjustment 
costs). Both habit formation and labor and investment adjustment costs make the responses of 
macroeconomic aggregates smoother, but neither adjustment costs nor habit formation are 
crucial for the qualitative results (see Appendix Figure D1). However, adding these features 
improves the model’s ability to match the timing of troughs.  
Next we study the implications of altering parameters of the production technology, the 
consumption aggregator and labor supply. Our qualitative results are not sensitive to changes in 
the production function parameters (Appendix Figure D2). Decreasing the elasticity of 
substitution between capital and labor from one to 0.5 amplifies the responses of all variables in 
the short run.
20 The quantitative results change little when we decrease returns to scale from 1 to 
0.95. Likewise, we find that altering the elasticity of substitution in consumption across goods 
and over time does not change our main results much although the lower elasticity of substitution 
across goods tends to amplify the responses of macroeconomic aggregates (Appendix Figure 
D3). In addition, our results are not sensitive to varying the elasticity of substation of labor 
supply across sectors (Appendix Figure D5). 
                                                           
20 In the richer model with habit formation and additional adjustment costs in the flow of investment and labor 
higher elasticity has smaller effects on the impulse responses.   19
Finally we study the implications of altering the degree of wage stickiness. In contrast 
with the other parts of the robustness analysis, we found that wage stickiness plays a very 
important role. In particular, the key parameter governing the response of the macroeconomic 
variables to the collapse of the Soviet-Finnish trade is the persistence of real wages (Figure 6). In 
the case with fully flexible wages, the recession is short and shallow. For example, output, 
employment, investment and consumption fall only by 2-5 percent and there are hardly any 
dynamics after the first year. Thus, the response of investment, output, consumption and 
employment is small when compared to the response of these variables in the data. On the other 
hand, the response of real wages is overstated. In the data, wages declined gradually, while the 
model with fully flexible wages predicts an immediate 7.5 percent decline. At the sectoral level, 
fully flexible wages fail to capture the contraction across sectors. In particular, the non-Soviet 
sector expands in response to the collapse of the Soviet-Finnish trade: as resources are released 
from the Soviet sector they flow into the relatively more productive non-Soviet sector. In 
contrast, when wages are rigid, the oil shock reduces the marginal product of labor and firms 
would like to hire less labor at the current wages or to keep employment fixed but cut wages. If 
wages are rigid, the adjustment occurs via quantities and the model can capture sizable decreases 
in output, consumption, investment and labor. The recession is considerably deeper when wages 
are inflexible. In summary, our qualitative and, to a large extent, quantitative results depend only 
on adjustment of real wages being sufficiently slow and in this respect our findings echo the 
results in Cole and Ohanian (2004). As reported in Section II, however, there is strong evidence 
suggesting that this was indeed the case in Finland.  
Figure 6 also shows the importance of the service sector in amplifying the response. Note 
that when we freeze the size of and prices for the service sector at the pre-collapse levels, we 
find that the size of the downturn at the aggregate level is only about half as large as the 
downturn when we allow the service sector to respond to the Soviet shock. This finding is in line 
with the intuition for amplification described above.  
1974 Oil shock 
Given the good performance of the model in explaining the recession in the 1990s, we are 
interested in assessing whether the model can also perform well in tracking the effects of 
previous episodes of energy price shocks. We examine in particular how the model fares in 
accounting for the macroeconomic dynamics after the 1974 oil price shock. Like the collapse of   20
Soviet trade, this shock produced a large increase in energy costs for Finland. Unlike the Soviet 
trade collapse, however, it did not cause a major dislocation in Finland’s economic structure and 
sectoral factor allocations. In particular, during this episode Finland continued to import 
subsidized energy from the USSR in exchange for specialized exports. Hence, if in this 1974 oil 
shock experiment the model dynamics are still consistent with those observed in the data, we 
gain more confidence about the conclusions derived in the previous subsection. In this exercise, 
we keep the model calibrated as before. The only modifications we make are to the speed of 
wage adjustment, which we set to  123 0.9      (Finland was less unionized in the early 
1970s), and energy intensity, which we set a 25 percent higher (the Finnish economy was more 
energy intensive in 1970s than in early 1990s).
21  
Although most economies experienced the oil shock early in 1974, the shock to the 
Finnish economy was somewhat delayed because the oil price in the Finnish-Soviet trade was a 
moving average of the world price. Hence, we assume that the shock to the world price occurs in 
the first quarter of 1974 and it hits the Finnish economy in the last quarter of 1974. To calibrate 
the size of the shock, we compute the unit price of imported oil in 1973 and 1974 and find that 
the (log) change in the price was 109 percent.  
Figure 7 plots the model’s transitional dynamics in response to the oil price shock and the 
dynamics of actual output, consumption and investment. Again, we detrend the data to remove 
secular movements in macroeconomic variables. The model broadly matches the response of the 
Finnish economy. Although we do not have reliable sectoral data before 1975 to construct 
counterfactual movements in the data in the absence of the shock, we know from Figure 5 that 
exports to the USSR expanded in response to the oil sector. We also know that output in the 
Soviet sector expanded relative to output in the non-Soviet sector. The sectoral responses in the 
model (not reported) capture these facts as well.  
Sweden vs. Finland 
An alternative way to assess the importance of the collapse in the Soviet-Finnish trade in 
accounting for the Finnish recession as well as to validate our simulations is to compare the 
output dynamics in Sweden and Finland. Both countries had similar institutions (including 
regulated labor markets with high downward wage rigidity, see Botero et al (2004) and Dickens 
                                                           
21 The ratio of energy consumption (in millions to TOE) to GDP (in constant 2000 prices) in 1973 was 25% larger 
than the same ratio in 1989.    21
et al (2007) for detailed comparisons) and experienced a similar and almost simultaneous 
sequence of events (including currency and financial crises) and policy responses in the late 
1980s and early 1990s with the only major difference being that Sweden had miniscule trade 
with USSR.
22 In a sense, Sweden could be used as a counterfactual for what could have 
happened to Finland if it did not trade so much with the USSR. Hence, we can utilize this natural 
experiment to evaluate the predictions from our model.  
Figure 8 plots the time series of percent deviations of output from linear time trend 
(estimated on 1970-1990 data) for Finland and Sweden. At the trough of the recession the output 
drop in Finland was about 22 percent from trend, while for Sweden it was 8 percent below trend. 
If we take the difference as a measure of the contribution of the Soviet trade collapse to the 
Finnish depression, then the magnitude of the contribution is broadly in line with impulse 
responses in our model. Hence, the observed difference between output paths in Sweden and 
Finland is consistent with our argument that the decline of the Soviet-Finnish trade explains a 
significant fraction of the downturn in Finland.  
 
V  Alternative explanations of the depression 
As we noted in the Introduction, two other competing explanations of the Finnish Great 
Depression are the “financial view,” which attributes the Depression to the major financial crisis 
experienced in Finland in 1992, and the “tax and productivity view” of Conesa et al. (2007), 
which argues that the Depression was caused by adverse TFP and labor tax shocks.  
According to the financial view, financial liberalization during the 1980s resulted in an 
over-expansion of credit, an over-valued stock market, inflated real estate values and a large 
stock of debt. A downturn in the economy in the early 1990s due to the loss of the Soviet export 
market and a slowdown in European growth triggered both a speculative attack on the currency 
and a credit crunch. Clearly these factors played a role but they can also be interpreted as a 
byproduct of the financial-sector effects of the Soviet trade shocks that first caused a severe 
collapse of the real economy. Indeed, troubles in the Finnish financial sector seem to have 
followed the collapse of the Soviet trade rather than preceded it.
23 This interpretation of the 
                                                           
22 Comparing the developments in Sweden and Finland between 1985 and 2000, Jonung, Kiander and Vartia (2009) 
observe that the two countries behaved as if they were “economic twins.”  
23 Real domestic credit, which had increased at a steady pace since the late 1970s, began to fall in 1992:1 and the 
exchange experienced a first initial depreciation in 1991:4, with a full currency collapse in 1993:1. Real GDP began   22
financial sector as “following” the real economy can be rationalized if we assume that financial 
variables responded to real developments as in a classic cash-in-advance setup. Hence, the severe 
retrenchment in consumption and investment expenditures due only to the Soviet trade collapse 
could have caused a proportional collapse in demand for real balances, which under a fixed or 
managed exchange rate and a set level of foreign reserves, could have been large enough to 
trigger a currency crash. If we consider also the possibility of financial amplification via a 
working-capital or financial accelerator channel, these developments could have fed back into 
the real economy and contribute to enlarge the magnitude and duration of the recession.  
We can get a sense of the extent to which a credit crunch can explain the depression by 
introducing into our framework an exogenous, persistent increase in the world interest rate. We 
assume that the interest rate increased in 1991 by one percent (a relatively modest increase). We 
set the serial correlation of the shock to 0.9 which is approximately the persistence of the interest 
rate in Finland. We consider two scenarios. First, the interest rate shock is the sole source of the 
depression. Second, the interest rate shock happens simultaneously with the collapse of the 
Soviet-Finnish trade. The corresponding impulse responses are shown in Appendix Figure D4. 
The results show that an increase in the interest rate depresses aggregate economic activity (with 
small effects on employment, output, and consumption but a larger effect on investment). We 
also find that adding the interest rate shock improves the fit of the model at the sectoral level 
when combined with other shocks. Specifically, interest rate shocks help the model to match the 
downturn in the non-Soviet sector. By itself, however, the shock has small quantitative effects 
for variables other than investment. We conclude from these results that a credit crunch indeed 
can be a useful complement to our story, especially for matching the dynamics of investment. 
With regard to the tax and productivity hypothesis of Conesa et al. (2007), it is worth 
noting that our oil price shock works like a technology shock since an increase in oil prices 
reduces firms’ profit margins (provided there is a sufficiently small substitutability of energy 
input).
24 Although the effect of the oil price shock on measured TFP is relatively small in our 
model, the trade shock leads to a significant decline in measured TFP with the dynamics that 
resembles the path of measured TFP in the data (Appendix Figure E1). Thus what Conesa et al. 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
contracting in the last quarter of 1990. In a comprehensive analysis of the banking crisis and credit crunch, Vihriälä 
(1997) concludes that collapse of lending is better explained by a decline in firm and household balance sheets and 
creditworthiness than by a contraction in supply of credit.   
24 A similar argument was made for the case of the United States by Finn (2000).   23
interpret as a TFP shock could be partly capturing the energy price and trade shocks in our 
model. 
We can also reconcile Conesa et al.’s labor-tax-like effects with our analysis by 
interpreting those effects as taking the place of the wage rigidities in our model. In an 
equilibrium without labor frictions, the wage received by workers is equal to their reservation 
wage, i.e. 
D
jt jt ww  . If wages are rigid, however, the reservation wage is not generally equal to 
the wage actually received. Furthermore, in a downturn, workers are willing to accept jobs at 
lower wages, but with inflexible wages there is going to be a difference between current market 
wages and the reservation wages, in particular 
D
jt jt ww  . Moreover, since firms stay on their 
labor demand curve, they cut employment. Because of these arguments, we can reconcile 
decreased employment (as observed in the data) with fully flexible wages (as assumed by Conesa 
et al. (2007)), if we interpret this situation as if there was a ‘labor tax’ shock. In other words, one 
can interpret 
D
jt jt ww   as arising from a labor tax   such that  (1 )
D
jt jt jt ww w     where the 
after-tax wage is equal to the reservation wage. 
While both labor tax hikes and wage rigidities can have similar theoretical effects, we 
were unable to find actual evidence of changes in tax rates in the Finnish press and legislation of 
the early 1990s. In addition, various measures of the tax burden on labor earnings exhibit little 
variation over this period (see Appendix Figure E1). By contrast, we documented earlier strong 
evidence of labor rigidities, including wage stickiness, in Finland. Hence, the empirical evidence 
suggests that labor frictions may be more relevant than tax shocks. Overall, we agree with 
Conesa et al (2007) that productivity and wage-wedge movements are necessary to explain the 
dynamics of macroeconomic aggregates; however, we interpret these movements as symptoms 
and argue that the Soviet trade shock may be the fundamental force behind these movements.  
An additional observation that favors our trade-shocks approach is that industries 
exposed to the Soviet trade experienced a deeper downturn than industries not oriented to the 
Soviet market. This pattern is clearly reproduced by our model, while shocks other that the 
Soviet trade shock should be unable to generate this pattern in general. Figure 9 presents the 
scatter plot for export share to the USSR in 1988 and deviation of employment from trend in 
1993 by industry. The slope of the OLS fitted line presented in the figure is -14.54 with standard 
error 6.4 which suggests a significant relationship between industry’s exposure to the Soviet   24
trade and its decline.
25 A one percentage point increase in the share of exports going to the Soviet 
Union is associated with a 1.4 percent decline in employment in 1993 relative to trend.   
 
VI Extension to Transition Economies 
There is ample evidence indicating that the trade and energy price shocks faced by the TEs of 
Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union were at least as severe as those experienced by 
Finland. The practice of overpricing machines exported from CMEA countries to the Soviet 
Union and underpricing raw materials (mainly energy) exported from the Soviet Union to 
CMEA countries is well documented (e.g., Marrese and Vanous 1983). Orlowski (1993), 
Krasnov and Brada (1997) and others find the same pattern for intra-USSR trade. In addition,  
while there was a strong redirection of trade for transition countries from former socialist trading 
partners toward the EU and other industrialized countries (e.g. Campos and Coricelli 2002), there 
is little evidence that exports of goods manufactured in the command economy were redirected. 
Rodrik (1994) and others argue that reorientation to the EU market of products previously 
directed to CMEA was not a prominent feature of the transition period. Furthermore, Rodrik 
(1994) reports evidence suggesting that Soviet exports could be sold in the West only with 50 
percent or more discounts. Given available micro level evidence, Repkine and Walsh (1999) 
contend that firms historically producing under different 5-digit SITC codes for the CMEA 
market could hardly reorient production toward very different products.  
These observations suggest that our model may be useful in explaining the 
macroeconomic dynamics displayed by TEs in the early stages of transition. Our simulation 
results showed that the effects of eliminating the energy subsidy and Soviet trade relationship on 
output, employment and other aggregate outcomes are greatly amplified by real wage rigidities. 
Because of data limitations, it is hard to establish whether real wages were rigid in Eastern 
European countries in the initial stages of the transition. Initial estimates of the wage elasticity 
with respect to unemployment rates suggested that real wages were fairly flexible in TEs (e.g., 
Blanchflower 2001). However, subsequent studies based on macro and micro level data tend to 
find that real wages in transition countries were almost as inflexible as wages in other European 
countries (e.g., Kertesi and Kollo 1997, Estevão 2003, Iara and Traistaru 2004, Von Hagen and 
                                                           
25 The estimate based on the Huber-robust regression, which downweighs outliers (e.g., non-metallic mineral 
products), is -17.6 with standard error 5.3.   25
Traistaru-Siedschlag 2005). In addition, labor markets in TEs appear to be as regulated as in 
other European countries (Botero et al 2004). On the other hand, it is hard to believe that real 
wages were strongly inflexible because inflation was high and variable.
26 However, there was 
also a strong political pressure to maintain living standards. Indeed, Roland (2000) argues that 
politicians could not allow wages to fall too fast and too much because otherwise reforms could 
be reversed. Wage indexation and dollarization of wages became common practice in transition 
economies. Furthermore, as observed in Rodrik (1994), the sharp increase in unemployment rate 
across transition countries is the prima facie evidence that wages were inflexible. In summary, 
although wages in transition countries adjusted in response to aggregate shocks, the adjustment is 
likely to have been incomplete and spread over time. Given that the size of distortions was 
greater in former CMEA countries (e.g., greater subsidy from USSR and greater specialization of 
trade with the USSR), one can expect that standard macroeconomic factors can explain a bulk of 
downturn in economic activity in transition countries.
27 
To support our hypothesis that the contraction observed in TEs can be explained with the 
oil price and trade shocks caused by the demise of the USSR, we would like to compare 
simulated transitional dynamics from the model (calibrated for TEs) with the data responses at 
the aggregate and sectoral levels (also for TEs). Unfortunately, due to severe data limitations, 
this comprehensive analysis is not possible. Indeed, we focus on Finland precisely because, 
unlike transition countries, Finland has reliable statistics at all levels of aggregation during and 
before the recession. However, we can assess the model’s behavior using a handful of reliable 
aggregate series for Poland and Hungary. We choose these two countries because they embody 
two different strategies of adjustment in transition. Poland allowed a quick and deep adjustment 
of real wages, while in Hungary real wages had gradual and modest adjustment (see e.g. Tonin 
2007).  
We use the model and calibration from Sections III and IV as the basis of our analysis for 
transition economies. Since transition and Finnish economies were different, we need to make a 
                                                           
26 Although wage arrears were another source of wage flexibility, wage arrears were largely limited to former Soviet 
Union republics and had little impact in other Eastern European countries.  
27 Interestingly, the experience of East Germany after unification is broadly in line with our arguments for transition 
economies. East Germany was also dependent on cheap Soviet energy and overvalued exports to the USSR.   
Unification with West Germany brought not only world-class institutions to East Germany but also overvalued rigid 
wages for workers in East Germany. After reunification, East Germany experienced a severe downturn in economic 
activity. Similar to the Finnish experience, wages were rigid and reallocation of resources massive. Even after 
almost twenty years after the reunification, East Germany continues to lag behind West Germany in many economic 
dimensions. See Akerlof et al (1991) for more detailed discussion on East Germany and effects of high real wages.    26
few adjustments to the calibration. Since wages were more flexible in TEs than in Finland, we 
consider a range of values for θ. We also modify the expenditure shares to match the relative 
sizes of the sectors. Specifically, we assume  12 34 0.2, 0.15, 0.5, 0.15        for Hungary 
and  12 3 4 0.2, 0.15, 0.45, 0.2       for Poland to match the fact that the service sector was 
larger in Hungary.
28 Given that the energy intensity of output in the former socialist economies 
was twice as large as in the OECD economies (EBRD 2001), we also double  123 ,, aaa. These 
modifications in  's   and  's a  are necessary to match the size of the Soviet sector, which we set to 
20-25 percent in Poland and Hungary, and the share of Soviet exports in total exports, which we 
set to 30 percent in both countries.
29  
To calibrate the size of the shock, we use the decline in the volume of exports to the 
(former) USSR as well as dependence of Poland and Hungary on energy imports from the Soviet 
Union. Hungary was heavily dependent on energy supplies from the USSR and the quality of its 
exports was inferior relative to Finnish exports to the USSR. Hence, we double the markup and 
assume that after the collapse of the Soviet Union the price of oil is effectively 20 percent more 
expensive relative to the pre-collapse price. Poland was less dependent on energy imports from 
the USSR and, consequently, we assume a 15 percent markup. To assess the size of the trade 
shock, we use the fact that between 1988 and 1991 exports to the USSR decreased by 60 percent 
for Hungary and by 45 percent for Poland.
30 Consequently, we set the trade shocks to 45 percent 
for Poland and 60 percent for Hungary. Finally, we assume that the collapse of the Soviet trade 
occurred (or started to occur) in 1990 rather than 1991 as CMEA started to disintegrate before 
1991.  
Figure 10 plots the dynamics of real GDP in the model and data in response to the Soviet 
trade shock. Strikingly, the model response to collapse of the Soviet trade is very similar to the 
actual responses of the Polish and Hungarian economies. The model can explain a bulk of the 
output contraction and the timing of the trough for both economies. The magnitude of the decline 
in the model depends on the speed of wage adjustment. In line with our model’s prediction that 
                                                           
28 In 1991 (the earliest year for which we have reliable data), services accounted for 57% of GDP in Hungary. In 
1992 (the earliest year for which we have reliable data), the share was 51% in Poland. Since services contracted less 
during the recession, we set sector shares to small magnitudes. 
29 We do not have reliable data to assess the size of the Soviet sector. However, various sources indicate that 
approximately a quarter of the CMEA economies were primarily concerned with exports to the USSR. The share of 
Soviet exports is calculated using IMF Direction of Trade Statistics (DOTS) database.  
30 Export statistics are taken from IMF Direction of Trade Statistics (DOTS) database. Other data sources (OECD, 
national statistical offices) report similar magnitudes.    27
greater wage inflexibility leads to deeper downturns, the model has a better fit to the data for 
Hungary when we use a higher value of θ which is consistent with the fact that Hungary had a 
slower wage adjustment than Poland.  In any case, it is safe to say that even for relatively flexible 
wages the Soviet trade shock accounts for at least 50 percent of the contraction. Hence, this 
shock could have been a quantitatively important source of economic downturn in transition 
countries.  
Although we do not have reliable data for many other transition countries, we can use 
fragmentary employment data to check whether adjustment of real wages is correlated with the 
response of employment in transition economies. Figure 11 displays a strong negative 
relationship between real wages and employment suggesting that countries with smaller declines 
in real wages experienced a larger contraction of employment between 1989 and 1995 which is 
consistent with our argument that incomplete adjustment of real wages could have contributed to 
the depth of downturn in transition economies.  
We also conjecture that misallocation of resources in the former Soviet Union could have 
played an important role in the dramatic output decline in the early 1990s. Indeed, an enormous 
fraction of the Soviet economy was militarized (15-20 percent of GNP according to various 
estimates, e.g. Steinberg (1992)) and had only limited ability to switch production to non-
military goods. For example, the All-Russian Scientific Research Institute for Experimental 
Physics (the developer of nuclear and thermonuclear weapons) was supposed to be organizing 
the series production of pipe connections for the milk lines of dairy plants (Menshikov, 2000). A 
tremendous shift in demand towards consumer goods meant a gigantic transfer of resources 
which was probably even more painful and costly than in other countries of the socialist camp.
31 
In other words, the shock was internal rather than external. In addition, many relatively energy-
poor Soviet republics (e.g., Ukraine) had to buy oil and gas at new higher prices (the energy 
subsidy was partially or fully removed shortly after the collapse of the USSR) which combined 
with the loss of demand from other Soviet republics resembles the shock experienced by other 
Eastern European countries and Finland.  
 
                                                           
31 Menshikov (2000) and others report that military orders declines by almost 70 percent between 1990 and 1992. In 
1992 alone, military production fell by 42 percent which constituted about a half of production decline in the 
military industry between 1990 and 1997. Cumulatively, between 1990 and 1997 arm procurements fell by 90 
percent, employment in formerly military oriented firms fell by up to 3.5 million people, more than 54 percent of 
production capacity of defense firms had to be retooled.    28
VII Concluding Remarks 
This paper examines the Finnish Great Depression of the early 1990s using a dynamic general 
equilibrium framework with labor frictions. Our analysis delivers two key results. First, we find 
that the Finnish Great Depression can be explained to a large extent by two exogenous shocks 
produced by the collapse of trade with the USSR (the surge in energy prices and the sudden 
redundancy of Soviet-oriented manufacturing). Since the identification of these shocks is 
particularly clear cut, this natural experiment evidently illustrates the behavior of a small open 
economy in response to large exogenous trade shocks. The key mechanism that amplified the 
initial trade shocks into a Great Depression was the rigid real wages in the Finnish economy. We 
show that our calibrated multi-sector model is successful in reproducing other historical episodes 
and produces estimates of trade shock effects which are supported by other pieces of evidence 
(in particular, macroeconomic performance in Sweden v. Finland and the response to the 1974 
oil shock).  
Second, our model can also account for the main features of the early 1990s adjustment 
observed in Eastern European transition economies, which displayed output dynamics and trade 
patterns similar to those observed in Finland. This similarity is particularly striking and calls for 
a reinterpretation of the sources of deep recessions in transition economies since Finland, in 
contrast to transition economies, had a well functioning system of markets, courts and other 
institutions. Although we cannot rule out alternative explanations for contractions in transition 
economies, the quantitative responses to the Soviet trade shock can account for a large share of 
the contraction in transition countries and Finland. In other words, the trade shocks we observe 
in the data could lead to economic downturns in standard theoretical multi-sector models which 
are remarkably close to the size of downturns we observe in transition economies. This important 
finding suggests that alternative explanations such as institutional transformations could have 
had a smaller effect than thought before.   
  The natural experiment of the Soviet-Finish trade downfall analyzed in this paper has 
broader implications. Specifically, we show that sectoral (trade) shocks can lead to significant 
comovement across sectors even in the absence of direct input-output linkages and static 
measures of effects of trade shocks can grossly overestimate the short-run cost of reallocation.. 
Reallocation of resources can be particularly costly in presence of sticky wages and/or prices. 
The Finnish experience can also shed some new light on the post-WWII contractions after rapid   29
changes in the composition of aggregate demand (e.g., disarmament in the U.S. after the Korean 
War). Likewise, we conjecture that our framework may be useful in analyzing the effects of the 
current economic downturn in the U.S. on its major trading partners such as Canada, Mexico, 
and China to the extent that their labor markets are rigid and the trade shock is protracted.    30
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Table 1. Exports to USSR by sector, 1988. 
 
Exports to USSR as 
share of sectoral 
exports 
Exports to USSR as 
share of sectoral value 
added 
  Share of total value 
added 
GRAND TOTAL  0.19 0.06     
AGRICULTURE, HUNTING, FORESTRY AND 
FISHING  0.03 0.00    0.058 
MINING AND QUARRYING  0.03 0.01    0.004 
TOTAL MANUFACTURING  0.19 0.24    0.242 
of which        
Food products, beverages and tobacco  0.27  0.06    0.027 
Textiles, textile products, leather and footwear  0.29  0.34    0.012 
Wood and products of wood and cork  0.07  0.12    0.014 
Pulp, paper, paper products, printing and publishing  0.13  0.22    0.059 
Chemical, rubber, plastics and fuel products  0.15  0.17    0.025 
Other non-metallic mineral products  0.15  0.05    0.011 
Machinery and equipment  0.22  0.26    0.050 
Transport equipment  0.53  1.42    0.011 
Motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers  0.09  0.23    0.005 
Other transport equipment  0.84  2.24    0.007 
Building and repairing of ships and boats  0.85  3.34    0.004 
Aircraft and spacecraft  0.02 0.01    0.001 
Railroad equipment and transport equipment 
n.e.c. 0.86  1.03    0.002 
Manufacturing nec  0.06  0.03    0.009 




Table 2. Descriptive statistics for Soviet, non-Soviet and service sectors. 
  Soviet sector  Non-Soviet sector  Service sector 
Labor cost share  0.630  0.570  0.630 
Wages relative to Non-Soviet Sector  0.983  1.000  0.914 
Capital to labor ratio  79.318  103.152  106.137 
Share of employment  0.055  0.233  0.712 
Share of value added  0.056  0.269  0.675 
Share of exports in total exports  0.175  0.815  - 
Ratio of energy cost to value added   0.049  0.052  0.035 
 
Notes: the table reports moments of the data for sectors constructed as described in Appendix. Capital to labor ratio 
is computed by dividing capital stock (computed using perpetual inventory with annual depreciation rate of 5 
percent) by hours of work. Ratio of energy cost to value added computes the ratio of the cost of imported energy to 
value added in a given industry. We use the input-output table for 1989 to allocate of the cost of imported energy 
across sectors. 
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Table 3. Summary of calibrated parameters. 
Panel A: Sectoral parameters  Soviet Sector Non-soviet 
sector  Service sector Foreign good
Consumption shares, ζ   0.04 0.15 0.54 0.27 
Labor share, αL  0.57 0.63 0.63  - 
Disutility of labor supply,   1.65 0.40 0.13  - 
Energy intensity, a  37.84 21.56 47.51   
Price of the final good  - 1 - 1 
Wage rigidity, θ  0.99 (0,1)  0.99 (0,1)  0.99  (0,1)  - 
Capital adjustment cost,   1 1 1 - 
Investment adjustment cost,   0 (0.5)  0 (0.5)  0 (0.5)  - 
Labor adjustment cost,   0 (1)  0 (1)  0 (1)   
       
Panel B: Macroeconomic parameters       
Intertemporal elasticity of substitution parameter,    2 (5)     
Labor supply elasticity parameter,   1     
Capital depreciation rate, δ  0.025     
Discount factor, β  0.99     
Elasticity of substation in consumption parameter, ρC  0 (-1,0.33)     
Elasticity of substation in production parameter, ρP  0 (-1)     
Returns to scale in production, γ  1 (0.95)     
Price of oil, p
S  1     
Habit formation in consumption, h  0 (0.8)     
      
 
Notes: figures in parentheses show parameter values used in sensitivity analyses. 
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Figure 1. Macroeconomic dynamics in Finland. 
Panel A: Real GDP, Investment and Consumption in Finland.  Panel B: Real GDP in Finland and Eastern Europe 
 
 
Panel C: Finnish exports to USSR and dollar price of Soviet oil.  Panel D: Structure of Finnish imports from the USSR 
 
 
Notes: Panel A: Series are normalized to be equal 100 in 1990. The data are from OECD National Accounts database. Panel B: Series are 
normalized to be equal 100 in 1990. The data are from National Accounts Estimates of Main Aggregates, United Nations Statistics 
Division. Panel C: Soviet oil price series is from International Energy Agency. Average oil price is from IMF IFS. For post 1991 years, 
Soviet Union exports are computed as the sum of exports to the 15 republics of the former Soviet Union. The vertical line shows 1991. 
The data are from OECD, Finnish Ministry of Statistics, author’s calculations. Panel D: For post 1991 years, Soviet Union exports are 
computed as the sum of exports to the 15 republics of the former Soviet Union. The vertical line shows 1991. The data are from OECD, 
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Figure 2. Soviet and non-Soviet exports for selected industries.  
Panel  A:  Cable  and  wire        Panel  B:  Railroad  equipment 
  
Panel  C:  Shipbuilding        Panel  D:  Footwear 
  
Notes: The stacked area charts display exports by destination, Soviet vs. non-Soviet. Combined area shows total exports. Exports are in thousands of fixed 2000 
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Figure 3. Distribution of annual nominal wage growth by industry.  
    
     
     
     
     
Notes: This figure reports distribution of individual workers’ annual nominal wages. Vertical axis measures fraction. Horizontal 
axis measures percent change in annual nominal wages. The bar in blue indicates the level of inflation. Source: Bockerman, 
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1994: Service sector  38
 
Figure 4. Macroeconomic aggregates: Simulated response to oil and trade shocks, percent deviations from trend. Baseline calibration.  
 
 
Notes: The figures plot percent deviations from 1990 value (for net export to GDP ratio) or trend (for all variables). See Appendix B for more details on detrending. Trade shock is 
the shock with corresponds to setting trade with USSR to zero while keeping the oil price constant. Oil price shock is the 10 percent increase in the oil price while keeping the 
volume of trade with the USSR constant.  
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Figure 5. Simulated response to oil and trade shocks, percent deviations from trend: Sectoral dynamics. 
 Soviet  sector  Non-Soviet sector  Service sector 
 
 
    
 
    
 
    
 
Notes: Baseline calibration. The figures plot percent deviations from trend for all variables. See Appendix B for more details on 
detrending. Trade shock is the shock with corresponds to setting trade with USSR to zero while keeping the oil price constant. Oil 
price shock is the 10 percent increase in the oil price while keeping the volume of trade with the USSR constant.  






























































































































































Figure 6. Macroeconomic aggregates, percent deviations from trend: Effects of wage rigidity and service sector. 
 
Notes: The figures plot percent deviations from 1990 value (for net export to GDP ratio) or trend (for all variables). See Appendix B for more details on detrending. Trade shock is 
the shock with corresponds to setting trade with USSR to zero while keeping the oil price constant. Oil price shock is the 10 percent increase in the oil price while keeping the 
volume of trade with the USSR constant. Scenario “flexible wages” sets 1 = 2 = 3 = 0. Scenario “rigid wages” sets 1 = 2 = 3 = 0.99975.Scenario “fixed service sectors” 
presents the response of the economy when we freeze the size as well as prices for the service (nontradabales) sector at the precollapse levels. In this scenraio, 1 = 2 = 3 = 0.99. 
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Figure 7. Oil price shock in 1974, percent deviations from trend.  
 
Notes: Solid line is the deviation of real GDP, real consumption, and real investment from the respective linear time trends estimated on 1950-1973 
data. Real GDP, real consumption, and real investment (in 2000 prices) series are taken from Penn World Tables. The deviation adjusted to be zero in 
1973. Broken line is the model impulse response to 109% increase in the price of oil. Model parameters are calibrated according to their baseline 
values. See text for further details. 




































Figure 8. Real GDP in Sweden and Finland, percent deviations from trend.  
 
 
Notes: the figure reports percent deviations from trend estimated on 1970-1990 sample of GDP (in logs) time series. 
 
Figure 9. Employment dynamics and exposure to Soviet trade, by industry. 
 
Notes: Deviation from trend for employment is computed as the log difference between actual value of employment 
in 1993 and predicted value for the trend estimated on 1980-1989 data. For shipbuilding and railroad equipment 
industries, the deviation is computed as the difference between employment in 1993 and 1989 because these 
industries had volatile time series. The slope of the OLS fitted line presented in the figure is -14.54 with standard 
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Figure 10. Output dynamics in Poland and Hungary, percent deviations from trend.  
 
 
Notes: Solid line is the deviation of real GDP series from the linear time trend estimated on 
1970-1989 data. Real GDP (in 2000 prices) series for Hungary and Poland are taken from Penn 
World Tables. The deviation adjusted to be zero in 1989. Other lines are simulated model 
responses. See text for further details.  
  






















data model ( = 0.99) model ( = 0.95) model ( = 0.9) model ( = 0.8) model ( = 0.7)  44
Figure 11. Real wages and employment in transition economies. 
 
Notes: real wages are computed as the ratio of average annual nominal wages to the average 
consumer prices index in the given year. Employment covers all sectors. The solid line shows the 
fit of the linear regression of the change in real wages on the change in employment. Data on 
employment, price level, and wages are from International Labor Organization, International 
Monetary Fund, and “10 Years of Commonwealth of Independent States” (“10 let Sodruzhestva 
Nezavisimykh Gosudarstv,” published by the Russian Statistical Office in 2001). For countries in 
the Commonwealth of Independent States and Baltic countries, statistics are computed for 1991-
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Appendix A: Data sources 
Export: Sectoral data on export by destination is provided by OECD STAN Bilateral Trade 
database and Finnish statistical yearbooks. From these data we compute the share of trade with 
the USSR for industry j in total exports of industry j. For the post-collapse period, we compute 
the shares using the total trade with former Soviet republics. Service sector is assigned zero share 
in trade with the USSR. OECD ITCS database is used to construct exports series for 1970-2003. 
We aggregate exports to 15 former Soviet republics to compute the volume and structure of 
exports to the (former) USSR after 1991.  
Output, investment, employment: Sectoral data on employment, hours of work, investment, 
output, total labor compensation and wage bill is taken from STAN OECD data base. 
Investment, output, and wage bill is in 2000 Finnish markka prices. Labor compensation includes 
wages, salaries, and social costs. Wage is computed as the ratio of wage bill to employment. 
Labor share is computed as the ratio of total labor compensation to value added. Service sector 
excludes public administration and defense as well as compulsory social security. Given 
constraints on matching consistent disaggregated production and export statistics, we use the 
following industries to construct Soviet and non-Soviet sectors:  
–  Textiles, textile products, leather and footwear 
–  Wood and products of wood and cork 
–  Pulp, paper, paper products, printing and publishing 
–  Coke, refined petroleum products and nuclear fuel 
–  Chemicals and chemical products 
–  Rubber and plastics products 
–  Other non-metallic mineral products 
–  Basic metals 
–  Fabricated metal products, except machinery and equipment 
–  Machinery and equipment, n.e.c. 
–  Office, accounting and computing machinery 
–  Electrical machinery and apparatus, n.e.c. 
–  Radio, television and communication equipment 
–  Medical, precision and optical instruments, watches and clocks 
–  Motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers 
–  Other transport equipment 
–  Manufacturing, n.e.c. 
–  Electricity, gas and water supply 
Energy: Finnish statistical yearbooks (mainly for 1993) provide information on the cost and 
consumption of energy by industry. Unit prices for oil imports are taken from Energy Statistics 
1994 published by the Statistics Finland.  
Consumption: Aggregate consumption is taken from IMF IFS data base and Finnish statistical 
yearbooks. Consumption is in 2000 Finnish markka prices. To compute consumption shares by 
sector, we use a detailed Input-Output table for 1989. This table provides information for 
consumption expenditures by sector. We apply export shares as weights and aggregate across 
sectors to construct domestic consumption of Soviet, non-Soviet, non-tradables (services) and 
imported goods. Since we do not know the share of domestic private consumption for imported 
goods and in our model imported goods can be only consumed, we multiply imports by the share 
of private consumption expenditures in total domestic expenditures (government, investment) 
and treat the product as the private domestic consumption of imported goods.    46
Appendix B: Detrending and construction of sectoral data 
Since our study does not focus on long-run growth, we study macroeconomic aggregates after 
filtering out their long-run trend. Figure B1 plots the dynamics of the series and the fitted linear 
time trend. To exclude the effect of the post-Soviet period we use data only for 1975-1989 to fit 
the time trend. We interpret the trend as the (counterfactual) dynamics of variables that we would 
have observed if there was no collapse of the Soviet Union and interpret deviations from trend as 
an impulse response to the Soviet trade shock. To make the comparison between model and data 
series straightforward, we rescale the filtered series so that they are equal to zero in 1990, see 
Figure B3. Note that the detrended series exhibit a much stronger decline than the raw series. For 
example, real value added falls by 11 percent, while filtered real value added decreases by 
almost 20 percent. In addition, macroeconomic series seem not to recover from the shock. 
Output, consumption, investment and other series stay permanently below the trend.  
Further analysis of the Finnish recession requires construction of the Soviet sector. Ideally 
we would like to have firm-level data with product output and export by destination. With this 
information, we could aggregate output of goods predominantly exported to the Soviet Union 
and treat this aggregate as the Soviet sector. The advantage of this approach is that we would be 
able to control for entry/exit decisions at the firm level as well as creation and destruction of 
products. These data would also allow us to assess to what extent trade with the USSR was 
redirected to other countries. Unfortunately, these data are not available so we construct the 
Soviet sector using industry level data. The risk of working with industry data is that there could 
intra-industry entry and exit of firms and products. For example, shipbuilding firms specialized 
in producing icebreakers for the USSR left the market while shipbuilding firms specialized in 
producing cruise liners entered the market. In light of this caveat, we construct the Soviet sector 
with the following approach.  
Define 
X
it   as the share of exports of industry i at time t to the Soviet Union in total 
exports of industry i. Let Qit be value added (or any other the variable of interest) in industry i at 
time t. Then we compute value added in the Soviet sector as 
SX
ti t i t i QQ    and correspondingly 
the non-Soviet sector is  (1 )
NS X
ti t i t i QQ    . To control for entry and exit of firms and 
products, we assume that the Soviet sector shares in exports to the post-USSR period are fixed at 
1992 values when the trade with the Former Soviet Union countries reached its minimum. We 
also fix the Soviet sector share at 1988 values for the period before 1988 to eliminate the 
extraordinary expansion of the Soviet sector during the period of very high oil prices in the late 
1970s and early 1980s. (Recall that trade between USSR and Finland require balanced trade and 
Soviet-Finnish trade agreements stipulated volumes of trade rather than values.) Thus we allow 
X
it   to vary only between 1988 and 1992. We refer to the resulting weights as ‘hybrid’ shares. 
We treat services as a separate sector producing non-tradable goods. We provide details on data 
sources in Appendix A.  
We plot series for Soviet, non-Soviet and service sector in Figure B2. Again, since most 
series grow over time we remove the trend component using a linear filter estimated on 1975-
1989 data (Figure B3). We fit linear trend model to each series individually. We do not impose a 
common trend. The Soviet sector exhibited the largest decline. Value added, investment, and 
labor collapsed. There was also a significant, permanent decline in the service sector. The non-
Soviet sector experienced a contraction in 1991-1993, but then it gradually recovered and 
exceeded its pre-collapse levels. Importantly, wages in each sector gradually decreased during 
the recession years.    47
Figure B1. Macroeconomic aggregates: Actual series and estimated trend. 
 
Note: The figure reports logs of real value added, real investment, real consumption, hours, and real wages. Solid line is time trend estimated on 
1975-1989 data. Broken line is actual series.  
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Figure B2. Sectoral dynamics: Actual series and estimated trend. 
 
Note: The figure reports logs of real value added, real investment, real consumption, hours, and real wages. Solid line is time trend estimated on 
1975-1989 data. Broken line is actual series.  
  


















































































































Figure B3. Aggregate and sectoral series: percent deviations from trend. 
 
Note: The figure plots percent deviations from time trend estimated on 1975-1989 data. The deviation is normalized to be zero in 1990.  











































Appendix C: Calibration. 
First, we calibrate elasticity of output with respect to inputs by utilizing data on cost shares  
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 Using data on wages (calculated as value added divided by hours of work) 
and on employment shares, we calibrate the disutility of labor. Specifically,  
1
1
33 12 2 1 1
123 1 21 3
1/ 1/
1/ 1/ 1/ 1/ 1/
123
() ( )












    
  
 










































ws h a r e
w jj j j L Y
j ws h a r e w share












and verify that output shares are consistent with employment shares and relative wages.  
We can also impute prices of Soviet and service goods using wages and capital/labor 
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The implied share of Soviet export in total export is given by:  
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Hence, we can calibrate key parameters of the model using data cost shares, employment shares, 
wages, and capital/labor ratios.  
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Appendix D: Sensitivity analysis 
In a more general specification of the model we allow for habit formation in consumption and 
adjustment costs in labor and investment. Specifically, the household optimization problem has a 
more general utility function: 

1/
123 1 1 2 2 3 3 4 4
0
(, , , ) w i t h
C
CCCC t
tttt t t t t t
t
UU G L L LG C C C C
     










jt jt j t hh CCC     is the habit-adjusted consumption for good j, and parameter  j h  
describes habit in consuming good j. 
In the firm’s profit maximization problem, the generalization amounts to the following 
modification in the objective function 
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where parameters  ,, j jj    are adjustment cost coefficients on capital, investment and labor 
respectively. All adjustment costs are quadratic.   
We assume small to moderate adjustment costs in labor: 1=2=3=1. Christiano, 
Eichenbaum and Evans (2005) report that investment adjustment costs are necessary to explain 
the response of macroeconomics aggregates to supply side shocks. We follow these authors and 
introduce a small quadratic cost to changing the flow of investment: 1=2=3=0.5. This small 
cost helps to generate a smoother contemporaneous response of investment to shocks. Numerous 
studies find a significant habit in consumption. A typical range is between 0.7 and unity. We take 
an intermediate value of habit persistence and set h1= h2=h3=0.8. 
We also consider an alternative functional form for the labor supply for different sectors. 
In particular, we examine how the choice of ρL (which controls the elasticity of substitution of 
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From the first order conditions and our baseline calibration of labor supply elasticity 
being equal to η = 1, one can find that our baseline formulation of the model is approximately 
recovered when ρL = 2.    52
Figure D1. Macroeconomic aggregates: Effects of adjustment costs and habit formation, percent deviations from trend. 
 
Notes: The figures plot percent deviations from 1990 value (for net export to GDP ratio) or trend (for all variables). See Appendix B for more details on detrending. Trade shock is 
the shock with corresponds to setting trade with USSR to zero while keeping the oil price constant. Oil price shock is the 10 percent increase in the oil price while keeping the 
volume of trade with the USSR constant. Scenario “all frictions” includes habit formation in consumption (h = 0.8 for types of consumption goods), investment adjustment costs 
(=0.5 in all sectors), and labor adjustment costs (=1 in all sectors).  
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Figure D2. Macroeconomic aggregates: Effects of production function parameters, percent deviations from trend. 
 
Notes: The figures plot percent deviations from 1990 value (for net export to GDP ratio) or trend (for all variables). See Appendix B for more details on detrending. Trade shock is 
the shock with corresponds to setting trade with USSR to zero while keeping the oil price constant. Oil price shock is the 10 percent increase in the oil price while keeping the 
volume of trade with the USSR constant. Scenario “CES production” assumes CES production function in all sectors with elasticity of substitution between capital and labor equal 
to 0.5. Scenario “RTS  =0.95” sets returns to scale in each sector equal to 0.95. 
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Figure D3. Macroeconomic aggregates: Effects of consumption parameters, percent deviations from trend. 
 
Notes: The figures plot percent deviations from 1990 value (for net export to GDP ratio) or trend (for all variables). See Appendix B for more details on detrending. Trade shock is 
the shock with corresponds to setting trade with USSR to zero while keeping the oil price constant. Oil price shock is the 10 percent increase in the oil price while keeping the 
volume of trade with the USSR constant. Scenario “IES parameter  = 5” corresponds to setting intertemporal elasticity of substitution to 1/5. Scenario “Elasticity parameter C =  
-1” corresponds to setting the elasticity of substation across consumption goods (in the consumption aggregator) equal to ½. Scenario “Elasticity parameter C =  0.33” corresponds 
to setting the elasticity of substation across consumption goods (in the consumption aggregator) equal to 1.5.   
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Figure D4. Macroeconomic aggregates: Interest rate shock, percent deviations from trend. 
 
 
Notes: The figures plot percent deviations from 1990 value (for net export to GDP ratio) or trend (for all variables). See Appendix B for more details on detrending. Trade shock is 
the shock with corresponds to setting trade with USSR to zero while keeping the oil price constant. Oil price shock is the 10 percent increase in the oil price while keeping the 
volume of trade with the USSR constant. All models include frictions such as habit formation in consumption (h = 0.8 for types of consumption goods), investment adjustment 
costs (=0.5 in all sectors), and labor adjustment costs (=1 in all sectors). 
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Figure D5. Macroeconomic aggregates: Effects of substitutability of labor supply, percent deviations from trend. 
 
Notes: The figures plot percent deviations from 1990 value (for net export to GDP ratio) or trend (for all variables). See Appendix B for more details on detrending. The model 
responses correspond for values for the parameter ρL which controls the elasticity of substitution across different types of labor. Specifically, the elasticity is given by  (1/(ρL - 1)).  
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Appendix E: Auxiliary tables and figures.  
Table E1. Static cost of the collapse in Soviet trade. 
    1989 1990 1991 
Panel A:     
A  Imports from the USSR   14,816  12,655  7,455 
F  Exports to the USSR  16,160  14,324  4,520 
  Change in prices in Soviet trade (% from previous year)       
C  Export prices  6.17  25.02  -24.33 
B  Import prices  22.43  12.99  -5.86 
D  Price premium in Soviet market in 1990 (markup over 
price available in other markets) 
 36 36 
H  Change in export volume to USSR    -11.36  -68.44 
J  Increase in the domestic price of energy    15.98  -1.14 
K  Value of energy imports from USSR (at domestic prices)    7,642  6,009 
L  Reduction in energy use by subsidized users    -0.94  -2.43 
M Market loss effect = D  F(-1)  H   -661  -3529 
N Terms of trade effect = A  (C – B)   1,522  -1,376 
R Removal of subsidy effect = ½  J  K L   -5.8  0.8 
Total loss of income = M + N + R   856  -4,905 
Total loss of income (million USD)      -1,212 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP)    521,021  498,067 
Private sector value added (PSVA)    389,798  356,207 
Total loss of income       
% of GDP    0.16%  -0.98% 
% of PSVA    0.22%  -1.38% 
Lost ruble surpluses (million Finnish markka)      -7,500 
Lost ruble surpluses (million USD)      -1,853 
Total loss of income incl. lost ruble surpluses       
% of GDP      -2.5% 
% of PSVA      -3.5% 
Panel B:      
Cumulative 1990-1991 total loss of income   % of GDP 
Billion 
USD  
Poland -3.5%  -2.20   
Hungary -7.8%  -1.97   
Czech Republic  -7.5%  -3.40   
 
Notes: The cost of the collapsed trade is compute according to the method developed in Rodrik (1994). 
Estimate of cumulative shocks for Poland, Hungary and Czech Republic are taken from Rodrik (1994). 
Unless indicated, Finnish exports, imports, value added, and lost ruble reserves are in million of Finnish 
markka. Sources: Finnish Ministry of Statistics, OECD STAN database.   58

































Reforms Related to Centralized Agreement 
% p/hour
 1988    Union-level agreements   2 year   01.03.1988     98-145   5.3    
 1989    Combined economic and 
incomes policy settlement  
1 year   01.03.1989   min. 1  40  0.1%  3.6  –  employees’ real disposable income to be increased by 2.5 
%  
–  earnings development guarantee of 70 p above the agreed 
increase paid in addition to the general and equality raise  
 1990    Kallio 15.01.1990   2 year   01.03.1990  





0.4% 5.4  –  state measures, including tax revision  
–  target for growth in employees’ real disposable incomes 
1990 - 91 4.5%  
–  earnings development guarantee III/89 - III/90 4% above 
agreed increase  
 1991    2nd phase 15.11.1990      01.05.1991   min. 0.9  50  0.3%  1.7  –   shop stewards agreement  
–  working time issues  
–  adult education, housing and social policy measures  




0 0 0 0.2  –  financing of employment pensions and the employees’ 
contribution  
–  government measures including maintaining  
 1993    Ihalainen-Kahri 2nd phase 
30.11.1992  
      0 0 0  0  –   the level of unemployment benefits  
–  development of agreements’ system  
 1994    Union-level agreements   1 year   1.11.1993         3.2    
 1995    Union-level agreements   1-2 year          5.2    
 1996    Economic, Employment and 
Labor Market Policy  
2 year   1.11.1995   min. 1.8  105    2.1  –  indexation clause  
–  earnings development guarantee 1996 and 1997  
–  working life development  
   Agreement 1996 - 97 
10.9.1995 
   1.10.1996   min. 1.3  65  0.3%  1.7  –  state measures i.e. concerning taxation and unemployment 
security  
 1997    2nd phase              0.0    
 1998    Incomes policy agreement 
1998 - 1999 12.12.1997  
2 year   1.1.1998   min. 1.6  85 p  0.3%  2.5  –  indexation clause  
–  earnings development examination  
–  quality of working life  
–  taxation measures  
 1999    2nd phase       1.1.1999   min. 1.6  85 p    1.7   
Source: Central Organization of Finnish Trade Unions (SAK).  
                                                           
32 Industrial workers.   59
 
Figure E1. Measure TFP in Finland, 1991-1997. 
 
Notes: The figure plots TFP measured according to standard growth accounting applied to 
aggregate series in the data and impulse responses of aggregate series in the model. The method is 
described in Conesa et al (2007).  
 
   

















Figure E2. Tax burden. 
 




















































































Local government income tax rate Effective income tax rate
Tax on earnings/Labor compensation Total tax revenues/Value added